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COMMENT
A RIGHT UNDER OSHA TO REFUSE UNSAFE
WORK OR A HOBSON'S CHOICE OF
SAFETY OR JOB?
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1970, federal regulation of safety and health in the
industrial workplace was limited to a few industries.' The only
universal provisions available in federal law to prevent occupational
injury were the self-help remedies within the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)2 and the Labor-Management Relations Act
(LMRA).3 Section 7 of the NLRA4 provides employees with the right
to act concertedly for mutual aid and protection; section 502
of the LMRA 5 protects the refusal of employees to work in
abnormally dangerous conditions from being considered a strike.
Although allowing workers to avoid immediate dangers, these
provisions did little to produce lasting safety improvements in the
workplace. Consequently, the only remedy available to most workers
was compensation after injury had occurred.
6
A major change in national policy occurred with the enactment
of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA). 7 With
1. See, e.g., Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801- 960
(1976) as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-164, §§ 101-115, 303-07, 91 Stat. 1290
(1977); Act of August 9, 1969, 40 U.S.C. § 333 (1976), as amended by Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 4(b)(2), 84 Stat. 1592 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as OSHA]; Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976),
as amended by Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 1, 73 Stat. 688 (1959); Walsh-Healey Act, 41
U.S.C. §§ 35, 38 (1976), as amended by OSHA, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 4(b)(2), 84
Stat. 1592 (1970).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976), as amended by Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947, ch. 120, §§ 1 et seq., 61 Stat. 136.
3. Ch. 120, tit. I §§ 1-17, tit. II §§ 201-212, tit. III §§ 301-305, tit. IV §§ 401-402, tit. V
§§ 501-503, 61 Stat. 136 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(1976)).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
6. Under common law tort theory, employers owed their employees a duty to
provide a safe place to work. Any worker injured as a consequence of the
employer's failure to exercise reasonable ca're could maintain a negligence action
to recover damages. This remedy was extremely limited, however. An employer
could only be liable for those conditions of which he knew or had reason to know.
Recovery was further restricted by application of the principles of contributory
negligence and the fellow servant rule. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 80 at 526-37 (4th ed. 1971); Blumrosen, Ackerman, Kligerman, Van Schaick &
Sheely, Injunctions Against Occupational Hazards: The Right to Work Under
Safe Conditions, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 702, 708-12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
BLUMROSEN]. In most jurisdictions, a worker's common law remedy has been
displaced by workmen's compensation statutes. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art.
101, §§ 1-102 (1979).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§651-678 (1976).
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the passage of this legislation, Congress declared accident preven-
tion in all American workplaces a national priority. 8 Although
OSHA encompasses a comprehensive administrative scheme to
effect directly a reduction of work-related injury, it does not
expressly grant workers the right to refuse hazardous job assign-
ments. The Secretary of Labor, however, has issued a regulation that
permits employees to refuse unsafe work in certain, limited circum-
stances.9
Recent challenges to this regulation have raised the difficult
question of whether Congress intended OSHA's administrative
procedures to be the exclusive means by which workers can seek to
obtain a safe workplace and thus avert injury to themselves. 10
Courts answering this question have not come to a unanimous
conclusion. In Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co.," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, held
that the Secretary of Labor had exceeded his authority in promulgat-
ing the regulation, reasoning from the Act's legislative history that
Congress did not intend employee self-help to be part of the statutory
scheme to eliminate occupational injury. Similar results have been
reached by two United States District Courts. 12 In contrast, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp.,'3 found the
self-help measure in the regulation consistent with congressional
intent and the purposes of the Act. Accordingly, the court upheld the
right of workers under OSHA to refuse unsafe job assignments.
8. OSHA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976). OSHA does not, however, apply to federal,
state, or local government employees. OSHA §§ 3(5), (6), 29 U.S.C. §§ 654(5), (6)
(1976). Section 19 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 668 (1976), requires federal agencies to
establish "effective and comprehensive occupational health and safety pro-
grams" for their employees. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 19.60.1-19.60.49 (1978).
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1978). See text accompanying notes 47-60 infra.
10. Workers may still resort to private civil actions to prevent occupational injury.
BLUMROSEN, supra note 6, at 707, argues that OSHA does not create a federal
private right of action for violation of safety standards, but rather that state law
may be used to obtain injunctive relief against dangerous working conditions. Id.
at 714-27. Atleson, Threats to Health and Safety: Employee Self-Help Under the
NLRA, 57 MINN. L. REV. 647, 704 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ATLESON],
maintains, in contrast, that private enforcement of OSHA safety standards via
an injunction is not inconsistent with the Act. See generally Hollis & Howell,
Occupational Safety and Health Act: Potential Civil Remedies, 10 FORUM 999
(1975); Comment, Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: Its Role In Civil
Litigation, 28 Sw. L.J. 999 (1974).
11. 563 F.2d 707, rehearing en banc denied, 566 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 216 (1978).
12. Usery v. Certified Welding Corp. and Wycon Chemical Co., No. C77-064 (D. Wyo.
Sept. 19, 1977); Aders v. Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 76-292-17 (D.N.M. Oct. 13,
1976). Three United States District Courts within the Sixth Circuit that
invalidated the Secretary's regulation were reversed by that circuit's decision in
Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1979).
13. 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1979). Accord, Marshall v. Seaward Constr. Co., No. 78-95
(D.N.H. March 28, 1979); Marshall v. Halliburton Services, Inc., No. 78-0185-E
(N.D. W. Va. Feb. 27, 1979). Whirlpool affirmed Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Corp.,
424 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
520 [Vol. 8
Unsafe Work: A Hobson's Choice?
This Comment examines the scope of the right to refuse unsafe
work under OSHA and the validity of such a right in light of both
the Act's legislative history and national labor law policy as defined
by the Supreme Court and Congress. In addition, because remedies
are also available under the NLRA to workers who walk off their
jobs because of unsafe working conditions, this Comment addresses
how the right provided by the OSHA regulation differs from and
could effect those NLRA rights.
II. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
A. The Administrative Scheme
Employee participation is an integral feature of the enforcement
scheme of OSHA. The Act imposes duties and confers rights upon
employees to ensure that the goal of maintaining safe workplaces is
achieved.14 The only duty applicable to employees is that of
complying with safety and health standards, rules, regulations, and
orders issued pursuant to the Act.' 5 In contrast, no less than twenty
rights are expressly secured to employees by the Act. Included are
rights to participate in every step of the formulation 16 and
application 17 of safety standards, as well as rights designed to keep
workers informed about conditions on their particular jobsite.' 8 The
most important for the purposes of this Comment are three rights
that enable workers to seek and obtain the elimination of hazardous
working conditions.
14. OSHA §§ 2(b)(1), (2), (13), 29 U.S.C. §§651(b)(1), (2), (13) (1976).
15. OSHA § 5(b), 29 U.S.C. § 654(b) (1976).
16. Employees have the right to suggest to the Secretary of Labor that safety
standards are needed in particular areas and to participate in hearings on
proposed standards. OSHA §6(b)(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. §655(b)(1), (2) (1976).
Employees also have the right to challenge the validity of standards that may
adversely affect them. OSHA §6(f), 29 U.S.C. §655(f) (1976); Industrial Union
AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
17. Employees have the right to be informed when their employer requests a
variance from a safety standard and to contest the application for such variance.
OSHA § 6(b)(6)(A), (B)(v), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(6)(A), (B)(v) (1976). If an employer is
cited for a violation of a safety standard, the employees affected may contest the
abatement period when it is unreasonable. OSHA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c)
(1976). Employees may not, however, challenge the sufficiency of the abatement
plan. United Auto Workers v. OSHRC, 557 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1977). When an
employer contests a citation issued by OSHA, employees affected may elect party
status and participate fully in the hearing. OSHA § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c)
(1976). Employees may also obtain judicial review of Occupational Safety and
Health Commission orders that adversely affect them. OSHA § 11(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 660(a) (1976). Finally, the Act contains a separate provision pertaining to
employee participation in the enforcement of standards relating to toxic
substances. OSHA § 8(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(3) (1976).
18. Standards relating to toxic substances shall "prescribe the use of labels or other
appropriate forms of warning as are necessary to ensure that employees are
apprised of all hazards to which they are exposed, relevant symptoms and
appropriate emergency treatment and proper conditions and precautions of safe
1979] 521
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First, employees or their representatives may request an
inspection of their employer's place of business by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration when they believe a " violation of
a safety and health standard exists that threatens physical harm"
or when they believe that an imminent danger 19 exists.20 If the
Secretary determines there are reasonable grounds to believe that
such a violation or danger is present, he must make an inspection
"as soon as practicable. ' 21
Second, a representative of the employees has the right to
accompany an OSHA compliance officer when an inspection is made
to ensure that workers have an opportunity to assist in the
inspection. 22 Workers also have the right to provide information to
the OSHA inspector concerning conditions in the workplace.
23
Should violations of the Act be discovered, one of two actions
can be taken by the inspector, depending on the degree of danger
involved. For violations of safety standards not threatening
immediate and serious physical harm, compliance officers must
issue a citation with "reasonable promptness. ' 24 A citation becomes
use or exposure." OSHA § 6(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (1976). The Secretary has
recently interpreted 29 U.S.C. § 8(c)(1), (2) (1976) and issued a rule to allow
employees to have access to employers' logs of occupational illnesses and
injuries. This right is available to all employees and former employees and
applies to any establishment in which the employee is or has been employed. 43
Fed. Reg. 31,329 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1904.7). In addition, where an
employer is cited for a violation of a safety standard, copies of the citation must
be posted at or near each place a violation referred to in the citation occurred.
OSHA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 658(b) (1976). Verbally explaining the contents of the
notice has been held to be noncompliance with this provision, even where
citations are in English and most employees are Spanish-speaking. Belau
Transfer & Terminal Co., [1977-78] OSHD (CCH) 22,681 (O.S.H.R.C. Feb. 2,
1978).
19. Section 13(a) of the Act provides that an imminent danger is one "which could
reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm immediately or
before the imminence of such danger can be eliminated through the enforcement
procedures otherwise provided by the Act." 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976).
20. OSHA § 8(f), 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1976). Employees who initiate inspections may
request that their names be withheld from requesting parties. Id. Moreover,
employers may not obtain the name of the requesting employee through the
Freedom of Information Act. Cf. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S.
214 (1978) (exemption 7(a) of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(7)(A) (1976), applies to witness' statements obtained by the NLRB in
investigating an unfair labor practice complaint); T.V. Tower, Inc. v. Marshall,
444 F. Supp. 1233 (D.D.C. 1978) (employer may not obtain name of employees
interviewed by the Department of Labor after fatal accident on employer's
premises). See generally Connelly & Fox, Employer Rights and Access to
Documents Under the Freedom of Information Act, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 203
(1977).
21. OSHA § 8(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(1) (1976).
22. OSHA §8(e), 29 U.S.C. §657(e) (1976).
23. OSHA § 8(f0(2), 29 U.S.C. § 657(f)(2) (1976).
24. OSHA § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1976). Employees have standing to challenge the
Secretary of Labor's withdrawal of a citation once they have elected party status
in a contest over a violation of the statute. IMC Chemical Group, Inc., 3 OSHD
(CCH) 23,149 (Rev. Coin. Nov. 19, 1978), reversing Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
5 OSHC 1405, [1977-78] OSHD (CCH) 21,840 (Rev. Com. May 16, 1977).
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final if not contested within fifteen working days of receipt and
requires the employer to correct the offending condition. 25 When a
danger exists that cannot be eliminated through enforcement
channels before it could reasonably be expected to cause death or
serious physical harm, section 13(a) of OSHA empowers the
Secretary to seek an order from a United States District Court to
restrain the practice or condition causing the danger.26 An order
issued under section 13(a) may "require. . .steps to be taken. . . to
avoid, correct, or remove such imminent danger and prohibit the
employment or presence of an individual in [affected] locations."
27
If the Secretary "arbitrarily" or "capriciously" fails to seek a
restraining order against an immediate danger, employees are not
left without a remedy. Section 13(d) provides the third right of
employees to seek correction of dangerous conditions. It permits an
employee, who may be injured by reason of the Secretary's failure, to
petition a United States District Court for a writ of mandamus
compelling the Secretary to obtain an injunction.
28
To guarantee that employees are not discouraged from exercis-
ing their rights under the Act, section 11(c) mandates that,
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate
against any employee because such employee has filed any
complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceedings under or related to this Act or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding or because of the
exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of
any right afforded by this Act.
29
An employee3° who believes he has been discriminated against
because of the exercise of protected rights must file a complaint with
25. OSHA § 10(a), (b), 29 U.S.C. § 659(a), (b) (1976). If an OSHA compliance officer
determines that a violation should be abated immediately, the employer can be
required to correct the offending condition before the fifteen-day period to contest
the citation has expired. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Brennan
v. Occupational Safety and Health Comm'n, 513 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1975),
rejected an OSHRC ruling that the fifteen-day contest period was also a grace
period for compliance and held that OSHA could reinspect within the fifteen-day
period to determine if the employer has corrected the hazard.
26. OSHA § 13(a), 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976).
27. Id.
28. OSHA § 13(d), 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1976). But see text accompanying note 56 infra.
29. OSHA § 11(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
30. Employees protected include applicants for employment and former employees.
29 C.F.R. § 1977.5(b) (1978). They would also include any person discriminated
against for the exercise of protected rights when the remedial purposes of the
legislation would be fulfilled. Cf. Clarkson Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 531 F.2d 451
(10th Cir. 1976); Magnus Firearms, Inc., 16 O.S.A.H.R.C. 1214 (1975) (cases
holding that purposes of legislation should govern as to who is an employee for
purposes of determining applicability of safety standards). It should also be
noted that persons prohibited from discriminating are not limited to employers of
the aggrieved worker. Included are employers of another, employment agencies,
or unions. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.4 (1978).
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the Department of Labor within thirty days of the alleged wrongful
action.31 To restrain infringement of the employee's rights, the
Secretary may institute an action on behalf of the employee in a
United States District Court. 32 Although the Secretary usually
conducts an investigation into the merits of the complaint before
proceeding to the district court, the need for, and extent of, an
investigation have been held to be discretionary.
33
A prima facie violation of section 11(c) is established when the
following are proven: (1) the employee was engaged in a protected
activity; (2) the employer had reason to know that the employee had
exercised his rights under the Act;34 and (3) the employee would not
have been disciplined "but for" his engagement in the protected
activity.3 5 Once a violation of the Act is found, the district court has
authority to order all appropriate relief, including rehiring or
reinstatement of the employee to his former position with back pay.
36
Reinstatement or rehiring has been interpreted, however, to be
available only when the employee has dealt with his employer in
good faith during the period of his discharge.
37
The extent of protection afforded by section 11(c), and thus the
efficacy of employees' Statutory rights, depends upon what actions
are deemed to be protected. When expressly mentioned rights are
concerned, courts generally have broadly construed the Act to effect
its remedial purposes. Thus, complaints "under or related to the
Act ' 38 have been held to include an employee informing his
employer about potential safety violations, 39 as well as an employee
retaining counsel to aid him in challenging an employer's unsafe
work practice. 40 In addition, both the Fifth and Sixth Circuit Courts
of Appeal have indicated in dicta that a temporary walkout to notify
31. OSHA § 11(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1976). The thirty-day period may be tolled
when there are "strongly extenuating circumstances." 29 C.F.R. § 1977.15(cX3)
(1978). Contra, Usery v. Northern Tank Line, [1976-77] OSHD (CCH) 21,520 (D.
Mont. Dec. 16, 1976) (holding that the thirty day period may not be extended).
32. OSHA § 11(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1976).
33. Dunlop v. Hanover Shoe Farms, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 385 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
34. If an employee initiates an inspection under § 8(f) of the Act and requests that
his name be withheld, a discrimination action based on the exercise of that right
will prove impossible to establish. See Marshall v. Alpine Aromatics, Inc., 3
OSHD (CCH) 23,144 (D.N.J. June 1, 1978); Powell v. Globe Indus., Inc., 431 F.
Supp. 1096 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.6(b) (1978). The "but for" standard means that discriminatory
motives need not be the only motives contributing to the employer's action,
merely the most substantial. This standard has been liberally applied. See
Dunlop v. Trumbull Asphalt Co., No. 75-1025-C (E.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 1976)
(employee found to have been discharged for participation in filing OSHA
complaint and not for two day absence that followed).
36. OSHA § 11(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1976).
37. Dunlop v. Trumbull Asphalt Co., No. 75-1025-C (E.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 1976).
38. OSHA § lf(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. §660(c)(1) (1976).
39. Marshall v. Springville Poultry Farm, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2 (M.D. Pa. 1977).
40. Dunlop v. Hanover Shoe Farms, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 385 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
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the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of safety
violations or to request an inspection would also be protected,
because such action implements expressly conferred rights.'" These
liberal interpretations of section 11(c) comport with the construction
of similar antidiscrimination provisions of the Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act,4 2 the NLRA,43 and the Fair Labor Standards
Practice Act.
44
Attempts to bring implied rights within the protective ambit of
section 11(c) have not met with like success, however. Employees do
not have the right to participate in post-inspection conferences
between a compliance officer and an employer.45 Furthermore, a
right to refuse hazardous work has not been uniformly recognized.
46
Judicial reluctance to enlarge the rights afforded by OSHA seems to
be motivated in part by a concern with overtaxing the ability and
desire of employers to comply with the Act. This concern, however,
poses particular problems for the administration of OSHA where
implied rights are necessary to accomplish the goal of preventing
occupational injury.
B. The Implied Right To Refuse Unsafe Work
Pursuant to his rule-making authority,47 the Secretary of Labor
has issued a regulation 48 that interprets section 11(c) of OSHA to
include an implied, but limited, right to refuse work that threatens
41. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 723 (6th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Daniel
Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, 716, rehearing en banc denied, 566 F.2d 106 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 216 (1978).
42. 30 U.S.C. § 820(b)(1) (1976), construed in Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine
Operations Appeals, 163 U.S. App. D.C. 104, 500 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975) (refusal of employee to work because of reasonable
fear of explosion constituted initiation of internal grievance process and thus
"notification" to agency of danger within meaning of Act).
This section was amended by Congress in 1977. Pub. L. No. 95-164,
§ 105(c)(1), 91 Stat. 1304 (presently codified in 30 U.S.C.A. § 815(c)(1) (Supp.
1978)). The Senate Report cited the Phillips decision and stated that it was
Congress's intention "to insure the continued vitality of various judicial
interpretations of the [discharge provision] of the Coal Act which are consistent
with the broad interpretation of the bill's provisions." S. REP. No. 91-181, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 36, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3436.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976), construed in NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972)
(NLRA prohibits discrimination against employee for giving sworn statement to
NLRB field examiner, although NLRA only protects employees who "give
testimony").
44. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1976), construed in Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d
139 (6th Cir. 1977) (statute protects former employees although statute on its face
only protected employees).
45. Ford Motor Co., [1974-75] OSHD (CCH) 18,598 (O.S.H.R.C. Sept. 10, 1974), aff'd
on other grounds sub nom. UAW v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 557 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1977).
46. See text accompanying notes 100-24 infra.
47. OSHA §8(g)(2), 29 U.S.C. §657(g)(2) (1976).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1978).
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life or may cause serious bodily harm. The right is activated when
the following four conditions are met:
1) a reasonable person under the circumstances would
conclude that the hazard presents a real danger of death or
serious injury;
2) there is insufficient time due to the urgency of the
situation to eliminate the danger through resort to regular
enforcement channels;
3) the employee refuses to work in good faith; and
4) the employee, if the situation allows, has requested
and been unable to obtain correction of the condition by his
employer before walking off the job.
49
This regulation was intended to supplement the administrative
mechanisms available to employees to eliminate serious occupa-
tional dangers. For example, under section 8(f) of OSHA, which
allows an employee to request an inspection of his workplace, the
Secretary need only inspect a worksite "as soon as practicable" after
an employee's request. The utility of a worker's right to request an
inspection is, therefore, inherently limited by the resources available
to the Department of Labor.5° It provides little relief when immediate
action is required but no Department of Labor personnel are
available to respond quickly to an inspection request.51 Moreover,
the effectiveness of section 8(f) may be further diluted by the
49. Id. The Secretary concedes that there is no general right to refuse unsafe work
under OSHA. The regulation provides, in part, as follows:
[R]eview of the Act and examination of the legislative history discloses
that, as a general matter, there is no right afforded by the Act which
would entitle employees to walk off the job because of potential unsafe
conditions at the workplace. Hazardous conditions which may be
violative of the Act will ordinarily be corrected by the employer, once
brought to his attention. If corrections are not accomplished, or if there
is dispute about the existence of a hazard, the employee will normally
have opportunity to request inspection of the workplace pursuant to
section 8(f) of the Act, or to seek the assistance of other public agencies
which have responsibility in the field of safety and health. Under such
circumstances, therefore, an employer would not ordinarily be in
violation of section 11(c) by taking action to discipline an employee for
refusing to perform normal job activities because of alleged safety or
health hazards.
However, occasions might arise when an employee is confronted
with a choice between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting
himself to serious injury or death arising from a hazardous condition at
the workplace. If the employee, with no reasonable alternative, refuses in
good faith to expose himself to the dangerous condition, he would be
protected against subsequent discrimination.
29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(1), (2) (1978).
50. As of September 1974, there were 754 federal safety inspectors available to
inspect 4.1 million work places covered by OSHA. 4 BNA Occ. SAFETY AND
HEALTH REP. 383 (September 1974).
51. OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, Ch. VI(B) (1975), reprinted in [1978] 1 EMPL.
SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 4340.4 indicates, however, that employee
inspection requests must be given the highest priority when imminent dangers
are involved.
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Supreme Court's decision in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc.,5 2 in which
the Court held that warrantless entries to make routine OSHA
inspections violate the fourth amendment to the federal constituion.
The Court in Barlow did not decide whether an inspection made
pursuant to an employee's request might constitute an exigency
justifying a warrantless entry. Even though there is strong
precedent for such an argument, 53 Barlow may generate resistance
to any warrantless entry, making swift action under the Act
difficult.5
4
Furthermore, under section 13 of OSHA, the Secretary is not
empowered to order an immediate removal or correction of the
danger; instead, the Secretary must obtain a court order. When an
employer refuses voluntarily to correct a condition, precious time is
consumed seeking court-ordered action under section 13(a). The right
of employees to compel action by the Secretary55 is an empty cure
when immediate action is the tonic. The writ of mandamus was
abolished by rule 81(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 and
section 1361 of Title 28 of the United States Code states that federal
district courts have original jurisdiction over "any action in the
nature of mandamus. '57 It has been suggested that by implication
such actions should now proceed as a regular civil complaint subject
to normal docket delays.58 Although it may be possible for employees
to obtain a temporary restraining order5 9 to compel the Secretary to
52. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
53. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Supreme Court held for
the first time that the fourth amendment was applicable to searches made by
administrative agencies. The Court was careful to note that the fourth
amendment warrant requirement does not apply in emergency situations. Id. at
539. Whether the Supreme Court would consider the probable presence of an
imminent danger an exigency justifying a warrantless entry by OSHA is
uncertain. The majority opinion in Barlow cited OSHA § 8(f)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 657(f)(1) (1976) as an example of the statute's attempt to authorize warrantless
inspections. 436 U.S. at 320 n.16.
54. The Supreme Court in Barlow was unconvinced that requiring warrants to
inspect workplaces would present any serious impediment to the implementation
of OSHA. 436 U.S. at 316-17. The Court recognized, however, that its holding in
Barlow "might itself have an impact on whether owners choose to resist
requested searches" and stated "we can only await the development of evidence
not present on this record to determine how serious an impediment to effective
enforcement this might be." Id. at n.11. The Department of Labor has reported
that since May 23, 1978 (the date of the Barlow decision), fewer than 500
businesses out of 11,000 inspected have demanded search warrants. 47 U.S.L.W.
2228 (Oct. 10, 1978). See generally Comment, Maryland's Warrantless Inspection
Laws: A Warrantless Expectation of Constitutionality, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 88,
91-106 (1978).
55. OSHA § 13(d), 29 U.S.C. § 662(d) (1976).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(b).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
58. Oldham, OSHA May Not Work In Imminent Danger Cases, 60 ABA L.J. 690, 691
(1974) [hereinafter cited as OLDHAM].
59. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b); OLDHAM, supra note 58, at 691-92. See generally
Levosdorf, The Standards for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525
(1978).
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act, it is unrealistic to assume that the unorganized workforce of the
United States would be able or willing to spend their personal
savings to accomplish that result. The lack of cases where workers
have sought redress against the Secretary's failure to act may be
indicative of this reality. The regulation allowing workers to refuse
unsafe work thus reaches work situations not expressly protected by
the Act and applies only when an employee is faced with a Hobson's
choice:60 refuse work and be fired, or continue to work and be subject
to the possibility of death or serious bodily harm.
To date, there has been little litigation concerning the circum-
stances that would entitle a worker to refuse a hazardous job.
61
Several courts, however, have considered the validity of the
regulation.62 Their conclusions rest largely on interpretations of
OSHA's legislative history. An understanding of these cases can
best be gained by first reviewing the events leading to the passage of
OSHA.
C. Legislative History
When H.R. 16785 finally6 3 emerged from the House Committee
on Education and Labor it contained several provisions that were
objectionable to a minority of the committee's members and to which
they refused to assent.6 4 These sections ultimately led to the defeat in
the House of what became known as the Daniels Bill and
concomitantly to the passage of the Steiger Bill,65 supported by the
60. Usery v. Babcock & Wilcox Corp., 424 F. Supp. 753, 757 (E.D. Mich. 1976), aff'd
sub nom. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1979). The term
"Hobson's choice" refers to Tobias Hobson, an English liveryman, who is said to
have compelled his customers to take the horse that happened to be next to the
stable door or go without a horse. Hence, the term connotes an apparent freedom
of choice with no real alternative. THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, Vol. 1, 406 (1971).
61. See Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 719 n.5 (6th Cir. 1979) (reasonable
belief in danger threatening immediate death or serious harm established when
worker had fallen through screen one week earlier; employer had been issued a
citation for a serious violation of the general duty clause, and the condition had
not been fully repaired); Marshall v. Halliburton Services, Inc., No. 78-0185-E
(N.D. W. Va. Feb. 27, 1979) (worker refused to drive truck on snow-covered West
Virginia roads - order denying defendant's motion for summary judgment);
Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Brennan, 4 O.S.H.R.C. 1241 (1975) (refusal to operate
allegedly unsafe crane not protected when no objective evidence of danger pre-
sented and employer had not been cited for OSHA violation).
62. See text accompanying notes 100-28 infra.
63. From 1969 to 1970, four occupational safety and health bills were introduced in
the House. H.R. 843, 3809, 4294 & 13373, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Moreover,
the Daniels Bill went through seven drafts in committee. See generally
Symposium: Developing Law of OSHA, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 317 (1974); Cohen, The
Occupational Safety and Health Act: A Labor Lawyer's Overview, 33 OHIO ST.
L.J. 788, 799-802 (1972).
64. H.R. REP. No. 1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1970) (statement of minority views),
reprinted in 116 CONG. REC. 31888-889 (1970).
65. H.R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 31873-881 (1970).
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Nixon administration.6 6 Two of these fateful provisions are relevant
to a determination of whether a right to refuse unsafe work under
the conditions specified by the Secretary may be implied from the
Act.
Section 19(a)(5) of the Daniels Bill allowed employers or
employees to request a determination by the Department of Health
Education and Welfare of the toxicity of any material on a jobsite.
Within sixty days of an affirmative determination, employers could
not require employees to be exposed to toxic levels of the substance
unless the material was labeled, informing workers of the hazards
associated with it, symptoms of overexposure, and precautions to be
taken when handling it. Additionally, employers were required to
provide personal protective equipment to guard against toxic effects
of the material. If these conditions were not met after sixty days, an
employee was permitted to "absent himself from such risk of harm
for the period necessary to avoid such danger without loss of regular
compensation of such period. '6 7 This provision was a by-product of
one of the primary catalysts to the introduction of a federal
occupational safety and health bill - increasing employee exposure
to highly toxic, industrial materials.68 It was designed to prevent an
employee from exposing himself to toxic risks of which he was not
aware and to protect adequately the worker when he knowingly
encountered those risks.
69
The Secretary's regulation differs from section 19(a)(5) of the
Daniels Bill in several respects. The Daniels provision was not
concerned with immediate threats to life but, rather, with long-term
exposure to health hazards, the effects of which would not be
manifest for years.70 In addition, the Daniels provision applied only
to one type of hazard, toxicity, whereas the Secretary's regulation
addresses all immediate dangers incapable of being corrected
through normal enforcement channels. Moreover, the walkout right
in the Daniels Bill contained none of the limitations of the
Secretary's regulation. No particular degree of danger was deli-
neated to justify a refusal to work. Indeed, no danger at all was
required, only an employer's noncompliance with the Act. Rather
than a means to protect the worker from imminent harm, section
66. Letter from Secretary of Labor Hodgson to Representative Steiger (Nov. 23,
1970), reprinted in 116 CONG. REc. 38374 (1970).
67. H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 19(a)(5) (1970).
68. S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5178-80 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report No. 91-1282].
69. 116 CONG. REc. 37326, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (remarks of Sen. Williams with
reference to analogous provision in the Senate Bill) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
70. This difference is highlighted by the requirement of the regulation that a danger
be so immediate that there be insufficient time to seek relief through
administrative channels, while under the Daniels Bill an employee was entitled




19(a)(5) of the Daniels Bill was primarily a tool to compel employer
compliance with OSHA.7
1
The objections to this section of the Daniels Bill focused on the
power conferred upon employees to refuse work and disrupt business
operations. Opponents branded the section as the "right to strike
with pay,"72 a term that proved to be the bill's epitaph. Congressman
Michel, for example, expressed concern that the provision could be
used by labor unions to avoid no-strike clauses in collective
bargaining agreements or be abused by individual union members.
7 3
The validity of these objections is substantially undermined by the
fact that section 502 of the LMRA, which permits workers to refuse
abnormally dangerous work notwithstanding the existence of a no-
strike obligation, has been successfully used for over twenty years.
7 4
Nevertheless, the legislative debates are replete with concerns that
the provision would disrupt labor-management relations.
7 5
Consequently, when the bill came before the House for debate
and passage, Congressman Daniels, sponsor of the bill, offered
several amendments in order to save it from defeat.76 One such
amendment eliminated the right of a worker to absent himself from
the job 77 and substituted in its place a right to request a special
OSHA inspection.78 The substitution was identical to a provision in
the Senate Bill79 and to section 8(f) of the legislation8° eventually
enacted into law. Both Congressman Daniels and Senator Williams,
sponsor of the Senate Bill, indicated that the right to request an
inspection was included in lieu of the right to refuse work when the
employer did not comply with the labeling requirements for toxic
substances.
81
Notwithstanding this compromise effort, the Daniels Bill was
rejected by the House.8 2 Unlike the Daniels Bill, the Steiger Bill
passed by the House did not include the right to refuse work or the
71. See Hearings, supra note 69, at 31887 (remarks of Rep. Steiger); id. at 37326
(remarks of Sen. Williams).
72. Id. at 38393.
73. Id.
74. But see, e.g., Tidemarsh Ventures, Inc., 54 L.R.R.M. 1197 (1963) (abuse of section
502 evidenced where employee's claim of unsafe working conditions found to be a
pretext to refuse work in retaliation for employer's decision to dock him for
unauthorized absence).
75. E.g., Hearings, supra note 69, at 38393 (remarks of Rep. Michels); id. at 38709
(remarks of Rep. Hull); id. at 36512 (remarks of Sen. Saxbe); id. at 37346 (remarks
of Sen. Tower).
76. Hearings, supra note 69, at 38378.
77. Id. amend, no. 2.
78. Id. amend, no. 3.
79. S. 2193, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., §8(f), 116 CONG. REc. 37319 (1970).
80. 29 U.S.C. §657(f)(1) (1976).
81. Hearings, supra note 69, at 38377-378 (remarks of Rep. Daniels); id. at 37326
(remarks of Sen. Williams).
82. Id. at 38723 (roll call vote: 220-173). The Daniels Bill was rejected before the
amendments offered by Congressman Daniels had a chance to be voted upon.
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right to request an inspection. 3 The Senate bill, however, was
ultimately adopted in conference between the House and the Senate,
with the House accepting the right of employees to initiate OSHA
inspections.
8 4
The second provision of the original OSHA legislation that is
relevant to whether a right to refuse unsafe work may be implied
from the Act, pertains to the procedure to counteract imminent
dangers.8 5 The Daniels Bill directed the Secretary of Labor to obtain
a court-ordered injunction against a work condition causing an
imminent danger unless he determined that, due to the urgency of
the situation, there was insufficient time to obtain such an order. In
the latter event, the bill allowed the Secretary to take summary
action to remedy the danger, including, if necessary, shutting down
an entire plant.8 6 The summary order could be effective for no more
than five days. Similarly, the Williams Bill in the Senate permitted
summary action by the Secretary when there was insufficient time to
obtain a court-ordered injunction, but limited its effectiveness to
seventy-two hours.8 7 In addition, before an enforcement officer could
act under the Williams procedure, the concurrence of the regional
director of the Labor Department had to be obtained.
88
The summary shutdown provisions of both the Daniels and
Williams Bills were the most hotly contested features of the
legislation. Proponents of the summary power argued that the Act
should contain some procedure to enable the Secretary to take
immediate action in situations when disaster was the probable
alternative.8 9 Advocates also pointed out that similar provisions
were found in most state occupational safety laws,9° as well as in the
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act,91 which had been passed only the
year before. 92 Opponents in both the House and the Senate focused,
however, upon the power of the Secretary to close an entire
operation, fearing that such a summary procedure would place too
83. H.R. 19200, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 38723 (1970).
84. CONF. REP. No. 91-1765, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5234.
85. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
86. H.R. 16785, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 12(a) (1970).
87. S. 1293, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 11(b), 116 CONG. REC. 37320 (1970).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 37340 (remarks of Sen. Williams).
90. Senate Report No. 91-1282, supra note 68, at 5190. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 81-406 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-11-107 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 338.131(1) (Baldwin 1978); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.50(31)(1) (1975); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 182.662 (West Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. Tit. 41, § 1720 (Supp.
1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-414 (1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 654.082(1), (2) (1977);
PA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 43, § 25-7 (Purdon 1964).
91. 30 U.S.C. §§814(a)-814(c), (i), 817 (1976), as amended by PUB. L. No. 95-164,
§§ 104, 107, 91 Stat. 1300-1303, 1307-1309 (1977).
92. Senate Report No. 91-1282, supra note 68, at 5190. Congress may have been
willing to vest mine inspectors with the power to close an unsafe mine because of
the extraordinarily disastrous consequences of mining mishaps.
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much power in the hands of an inspector 93 and violate due process. 94
Economic considerations were also paramount; lost production time
as the result of disruption or shutdown of plants was seen as
increasing the cost of doing business, contributing to inflation, and
generally causing American business to be less competitive. 95 The
more moderate procedure to counteract imminent dangers, supported
by the Nixon administration in both the House and the Senate, was
ultimately enacted into law. The Secretary is empowered to seek
court-ordered action only to avert immediate danger; no power of
summary action was conferred by Congress. 96
Both proponents and opponents of the summary shutdown and
strike-with-pay provisions had in mind the identical goal of
eliminating occupational injury. The differences between these
legislative factions reflected, therefore, only disagreement over the
procedures that should be employed to realize that goal. Congres-
sional concern with the appropriate procedures to implement the Act
played no small part in the findings of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals 97 and two United States District Courts 98 that sections 8(f)
and 13 are the sole remedies available to employees under OSHA to
93. Hearings, supra note 69, at 35607 (remarks of Sen. Saxbe); id. at 38380 (remarks
of Rep. Eshleman).
94. Id. at 38379 (remarks of Rep. Randall); id. at 38381 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn);
id. at 38393 (remarks of Rep. Michel); id. at 38703 (remarks of Rep. Steiger).
Although the Supreme Court held in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), that
even a temporary deprivation of a property right without prior notice or
opportunity to be heard violates due process, Congress was mistaken in
assuming that due process safeguards would be required in an imminent danger
situation. In Fuentes, the Court reaffirmed the principle that immediate seizure
of a property interest without prior opportunity for a hearing is constitutionally
permissible when "the seizure [is] directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest . . . [t]here [is] a special need for very
prompt action . . ." and "the person initiating the seizure [is] a government
official responsible for determining under the standards of a narrowly drawn
statute, that it [is] necessary and justified in the particular instance." 407 U.S. at
91. Thus, the Supreme Court has subsequently held that immediate summary
seizure is permissible to assert in rem jurisdiction over property in order to
conduct forfeiture proceedings and thereby prevent continued illicit use of the
property. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). Nor is
due process denied when postponement of notice and hearing is necessary to
protect the public from misbranded drugs, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950), or contaminated food. North American Storage Co. v.
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). Certainly, the need to protect workers from
immediate injury would also be an important government interest justifying
summary action. For a discussion of the due process problems in OSHA, see
Note, Due Process and Employee Safety: Conflict In OSHA Enforcement
Procedures, 84 YALE L.J. 1380 (1975).
95. Hearings, supra note 69, at 36512 (remarks of Sen. Saxbe).
96. OSHA § 13(a), 29 U.S.C. § 662(a) (1976).
97. Marshall v. Daniels Constr. Co., 563 F.2d 707, rehearing en banc denied, 566 F.2d
106 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 216 (1978).
98. Usery v. Certified Welding Corp. and Wycon Chemical Co., No. C77-064 (D. Wyo.
Sept. 19, 1977); Aders v. Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 76-292-M (D.N.M. Oct. 13,
1976).
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eliminate imminent dangers on the job and to prevent injury to
themselves. 99
D. Case Interpretation of the Right To Refuse Hazardous Work
In Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co.,1°° a crew of ironworkers
refused to work on steel beams 150 feet high because high winds
made their work treacherous. When one worker persisted in his
refusal to return to his job, he was fired. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit upheld the employer's right to discipline the employee
for his action, and held that no right to refuse dangerous work may
be implied from OSHA. The court in Daniel based its holding
squarely on the legislative history of the Act. It conceded, however,
that the right to strike provision of the rejected Daniels Bill did not
address immediate safety hazards, the subject of the disputed
regulation. 10 1 Moreover, the majority also asserted that Congress
had not considered the employee's dilemma of being forced to choose
between his job or his safety under the procedures available in the
Act. 102 Nonetheless, the deletion of the strike-with-pay clause and the
concern for employee abuse of that provision were interpreted as a
rejection of the self-help remedy.10 3 Furthermore, the court found that
Congress had included the right to request an inspection in lieu of
any right to walk off the job, and therefore a right to refuse
dangerous work could not be implied from the language or purpose
of OSHA. 10 4 Courts have interpreted similar antidiscrimination
provisions in other remedial labor legislation to include implied
rights when the purposes of the legislation were promoted.10 5 These
cases were not found persuasive. 10 6 The potential for abuse and
adverse economic consequences for employers constitute "substan-
tial countervailing considerations"' 0 7 to the court of appeals,
militating against a liberal construction of the Act.
99. When Congress has empowered an agency to promulgate rules and regulations
to execute its duties under a regulatory statute such as OSHA, regulations duly
promulgated are entitled to great deference by the courts. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
Accordingly, the standard of review employed to ascertain the validity of
interpretative regulations is a limited one: the regulation should be upheld unless
it is clearly inconsistent with the intent of Congress or it is an unreasonable
construction of the legislation. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333
U.S. 496, 501 (1948); Manhattan G.E. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134-35
(1936).
100. 563 F.2d 707, rehearing en banc denied, 566 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 216 (1978).
101. Id. at 714.
102. Id. at 716 n.21.
103. Id. at 714 ("[T]he wholesale rejection of the provision demonstrates that an
overriding concern of Congress was its fear that workers might abuse the rights
granted and disrupt or terminate their employer's business operations as a form
of intimidation or harassment.").
104. Id. at 713-14.
105. See notes 42-43 supra.
106. 563 F.2d at 713-14.
107. Id. at 716 (quoting NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972)).
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Allowing employees to refuse work, the Daniel majority
reasoned, would confer powers upon workers that were expressly
withheld from OSHA inspectors: to determine the existence of a
danger that could not be corrected through regular statutory
procedures and to shut down an operation without prior opportunity
for a hearing.108 The court did not equate the action of a government
official with that of a private person. Rather, it interpreted the
protections afforded by a judicially ordered work stoppage as
grounded on more than due process considerations. 10 9 Use of the
injunction procedure, the court implied, was a protection against
abusive employee conduct as well as arbitrary governmental
action.1 0
A clarion dissent was written in Daniel by Judge Wisdom. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found itself "in full agreement with"
this dissent in its decision in Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp.;"' both
opinions upheld the right of workers under OSHA to refuse work in
the face of immediate danger. Neither Judge Wisdom nor the
Whirlpool court found the sections of legislative history relied upon
by the majority in Daniel to be dispositive of the regulation's
validity. First, substantial differences were noted between the
Secretary's regulation and the strike-with-pay clause of the Daniels
Bill." 2 Moreover, the court in Whirlpool emphasized that the focus of
the objections in Congress to the strike-with-pay provision was not
the right to refuse work but the right to be paid when exercising that
right." 3 The right to walk off the job, the court reasoned, could not
have sparked the controversy in Congress because workers are
already specifically permitted to strike over safety issues under
federal labor law in two instances. 114 Because the regulation
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor does not authorize pay
without work, nor privilege an employee to refuse alternative safe
work, the court concluded that it is not subject to the objections
levied against the Daniels Bill.
115
Nor was the abandonment of the summary imminent danger
provision deemed to be controlling by either Judge Wisdom or the
108. Id. at 714-15.
109. Id. at 715 n.20.
110. The court did suggest, however, that a temporary walkout taken to request an
OSHA inspection would be protected by § 11(c) because it was necessary to
implement an expressly conferred right. Id. at 716.
111. 593 F.2d 715, 736 (6th Cir. 1979). Accord, Marshall v. Halliburton Services, Inc.,
No. 78-0185-E (N.D. W. Va. Feb. 27, 1979) (order denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment).
112. 593 at 730; 563 F.2d at 719 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
113. 593 F.2d at 730 (6th Cir. 1979). The validity of the court's conclusion is
questionable. At least one key legislator intimated that it was the right to walk
off the job that was objectionable and not the fact that an employee would be
paid for doing so. See Hearings, supra note 69, at 38708 (remarks of Rep. Steiger).
114. 593 F.2d at 731. The court cited § 7 of the NLRA and § 502 of the LMRA.
115. See id. at 734-35.
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Sixth Circuit. The opinions noted that the legislation, unlike the
regulation, permitted an official to close down an entire plant,
allowed changes to be ordered on the spot, and, most importantly,
vested these powers with an agent of the government. 116 Judge
Wisdom found the objections to summary action by an OSHA
inspector to be premised upon due process considerations. These
objections, Judge Wisdom argued, have no applicability where a
private employee is the actor because state action is not involved. 117
In addition, both the Sixth Circuit in Whirlpool and Judge Wisdom
asserted that it was the potential for abuse of authority by an
arbitrary inspector that Congress feared. The regulation, the
opinions concluded, presents no similar opportunities for abuse
because the right it provides may be exercised only by endangered
employees in narrowly defined circumstances.' 1 8
Concluding that Congress neither discussed nor contemplated
the dilemma addressed by the regulation, the Whirlpool court upheld
the regulation by relying upon settled rules of statutory construction,
as well as several policy and practical considerations. First, the right
to refuse work embodies one of the "other rights" mentioned in
section 11(c) of OSHA: the right to work in a hazard-free environ-
ment implicit in the entire law." 9 Second, the practical need for the
regulation is great. It removes a worker from the threat of serious
harm when the administrative procedures of OSHA are too slow to
effectuate Congress's goal of preventing injury; failure to provide a
remedy to an employee would be contrary to the remedial purpose of
the Act.' 2 Furthermore, because the regulation only provides an
interim remedy and requires no correction of the dangerous
condition, it promotes employee utilization of the Act's reporting
procedures under section 8(f), thereby reinforcing vital employee
participation and assistance in implementing the Act.' 2 '
The Whirlpool court also insisted that a narrow construction of
the Act would result in anomalous applications of its protections. An
employee who refuses unsafe work and immediately requests and
obtains an inspection by OSHA would be protected under section
116. Id. at 733-34; 563 F.2d at 720 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
117. 563 F.2d at 720. The safeguards of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment only apply to action taken by the state or its agents. Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). State action may be found in nominally private conduct
if there is significant state involvement, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), or
where the private party performs a function ordinarily reserved to the
government. Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) and Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) with Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345 (1974).
118. 593 F.2d at 734; 563 F.2d at 721-22 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
119. 593 F.2d at 725. The right of employees to work in an environment "free from
recognized hazards likely to cause serious harm" is specifically guaranteed by 29
U.S.C. § 654(a) (1976).
120. See 593 F.2d at 721-22..
121. Id. at 722.
19791 535
Baltimore Law Review
11(c) as his refusal to work would be but a step in the exercise of an
expressly conferred right. On the other hand, an employee who
refuses an unsafe job but is unable to obtain an immediate
inspection by OSHA would not be protected because the refusal to
work is not incident to the inspection request. Refusing to uphold the
regulation would therefore "lay a trap for the unwary employee and
* . . strip the employee of vital protection under a statute meant to
safeguard him.
'122
Finally, the Whirlpool court found support for its interpretation
of the statute in congressional action taken since the passage of
OSHA with regard to the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. In 1977,
Congress amended the antidiscrimination provision of the Coal
Mine Act. The amended version does not expressly grant the right of
employees to refuse dangerous work. Congressional debates, how-
ever, explicitly refer to, and approve of, protecting from retaliation
miners who refuse to work in good faith when they reasonably
believe a danger to be imminent. 123 Although the Coal Mine Act is
much more limited in application than OSHA, the Whirlpool court
interpreted these debates as an affirmation of the right to refuse
dangerous work in the circumstances such as those permitted by the
OSHA regulation.1
2 4
One commentator has astutely noted that implementation of the
substantive and procedural philosophy of OSHA requires balancing
the "need of workers to have a safe and healthy work environment
against the requirement of industry to function without undue
interference.' ' 25 The outcomes of the decisions discussed above
reflect the weights assigned to each side of this scale. In Daniel, the
significance attached to congressional reservations with the poten-
tially disruptive effects of the right to refuse unsafe work displaced
the undeniable need to provide some remedy to workers who are
confronted with the choice of their jobs or their safety. Although
consonant with the substance of some Congressmen's concerns, the
position adopted by this court is somewhat unusual. As Judge
Wisdom and the Whirlpool court noted, walkouts because of unsafe
conditions have long been part of labor-management relations. 126
Congressmen expressing fears of employee abuse seemed unaware of
this fact, for only once were the rights to refuse unsafe work in the
NLRA mentioned during legislative debates. 127 Because the regu-
122. Id. at 723.
123. Id. at 735-36; 123 CONG. REC. S10287-88 (daily ed. June 21, 1977) (remarks of
Sen. Williams and Sen. Javits); 123 CONG. REC. Hl1662 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977)
(remarks of Rep. Perkins). S. REP. No. 91-181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36, reprinted
in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3436.
124. 593 F.2d at 736.
125. McClintock, Symposium: Developing Law of OSHA, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 317, 323
(1974).
126. 593 F.2d at 731; 563 F.2d at 721 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
127. 116 CONG. REC. 42208 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Scherle).
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lation comports with the purpose of OSHA, and the language of the
Act is broad enough to encompass a limited self-help remedy, any
disruption that could occur seems a small price to pay for protection
against injury in the workplace. Moreover, as Justice Douglas said
with reference to section 502 of the LMRA, giving workers the right
to remove themselves from the possibility of serious harm "recog-
nize[s] in law what is in any event an unavoidable principle of
human behavior: self-preservation."'
128
The right provided by the OSHA regulation is not the only
remedy available to workers who refuse to work because of a
perceived danger. As the Whirlpool decision noted, employees may
have protection under section 7 of the NLRA if their action
constitutes a protected concerted activity.129 In addition, a walkout
over abnormally dangerous conditions is not deemed to be a strike
under section 502 of the LMRA.' 3° The existence of alternative
statutory remedies to employees was not seen as a reason for
invalidating the Department of Labor's regulation. In Whirlpool, the
court concluded that the NLRA and LMRA rights inadequately
protect workers for the purposes of OSHA, and that the remedies
afforded by the OSHA regulation are in any event coextensive with
the alternative statutory rights, thereby creating no conflict between
the acts.13'
There are, however, significant differences between the rights
and remedies granted by the NLRA, the LMRA and the OSHA
regulation. Providing an additional and different remedy to
employees who refuse to work would seem to be contrary to the
concern often expressed during the legislative debates that OSHA
would duplicate many of the existing federal laws and create
confusion concerning what is required in order to be in compliance
with the pertinent laws.
1 32
Alternative remedies available to employees who refuse to work
because of unsafe conditons are also significant given the "Memo-
randum of Understanding"'133 between the National Labor Relations
128. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 391-92 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). See text accompanying notes 143-70 infra.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976). See text accompanying notes 171-200 infra.
131. Marshall v. Whirlpool Corp., 593 F.2d 715, 726 n.23 (6th Cir. 1979).
132. E.g., Hearings, supra note 69, at 42208 (remarks of Sen. Scherle). Section 4(b)(3)
of OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(3) (1976), deals with the problem of overlapping
legislation. It provides that "[t]he Secretary shall, within three years after the
effective date of this Act, report to Congress his recommendations for legislation
to avoid unnecessary duplication and to achieve coordination between this Act
and other federal laws."
133. 40 Fed. Reg. 26083 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. The memorandum,
after citing §§ 7 and 8(a)(1) of NLRA, states, in part:
Although there may be some safety and health activities which may
be protected solely under the OSH Act, it appears that many employee
safety activities may be protected under both Acts. However, since an
employee's right to engage in safety and health activity is specifically
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Board (NLRB) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion. Recognizing that many safety activities expressly protected by
section 11(c) of OSHA are "only generally included in the broader
right to engage in concerted activites under the NLRA,' ' 1 3 4 the
agencies have entered into an agreement to eliminate duplicate
litigation and to "insure that employee rights in the area of safety
and health will be protected.' 1 35 Procedurally, the agreement
provides that "where a charge involving issues covered by section
11(c) of the OSH Act has been filed with the General Counsel and a
complaint has also been filed with OSHA as to the same factual
matters, the General Counsel will, absent withdrawal of the matter,
defer or dismiss the charge."'136 If the employee has filed only with
the NLRB, he will be informed of the right to litigate under section
11(c) of OSHA.137 Only where an employee fails to file under OSHA
will the complaint be processed by the NLRB. 138 Finally, when a
complaint filed with the NLRA covers both issues protected by
section 11(c) and matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB, the General Counsel will consult with the Solicitor of Labor
to determine the course of action that will be taken.139
The scope of the memorandum is unclear, but it purports to limit
employee access to statutory rights under section 7 of the NLRA
when, under the given facts, section 11(c) of OSHA may provide a
remedy and the employee has either filed a complaint or previously
litigated his claim under OSHA. Although the authority for
abdicating enforcement of NLRA rights seems questionable, 140 the
practical effect of the agreement could significantly curtail rights
protected by the OSH Act and is only generally included in the broader
right to engage in concerted activities under the NLRA, it is appropriate
that enforcement actions to protect such safety and health activities
should primarily be taken under the OSH Act rather than the NLRA.
134. Id. Compare Walls Mfg. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1962), aff'd, 321 F.2d 753 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963) with 29 C.F.R. § 1977.9(b) (1978).





140. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976) vests the General Counsel with "final authority" to issue
unfair labor practice complaints and thus the power to determine which cases
will be litigated before the NLRB. The courts have uniformly held that the
statute divests federal courts of jurisdiction to review the General Counsel's
decisions. E.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 161, 182 (1967); Mayer v. Ordman, 391
F.2d 889, 892 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968). It has been
argued, however, that such absolute discretion is incompatible with the intent of
Congress to make the NLRB the policy making body under the NLRA and
contrary to the principles of judicial review of administrative action. Rosenblum,
A New Look at the General Counsel's Unreviewable Discretion Not To Issue A
Complaint Under The NLRA, 86 YALE L.J. 1349, 1371-85 (1977); McClintock,
The Unreviewable Power of the General Counsel - Partial Enforcement of the
Labor Act, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 79, 103-15 (1976). See generally Saferstein,
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion,"
82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968).
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under the NLRA and LMRA. As will be explained later in this
Comment, this is particularly true regarding safety related walkouts
if the OSHA regulation allowing employees to refuse unsafe work is
valid. The practitioner, therefore, should be aware of the differences
in protection afforded walkouts under each act and know that prior
adjudication under OSHA may bar resort to the NLRA141 and vice
versa.1
42
The remaining sections of this Comment will discuss the NLRA
and LMRA rights that protect safety related walkouts and some of
the conflicts and problems created by the OSHA regulation in light
of the NLRB's deferral policy.
III. THE NLRA AND LMRA PROTECTIONS
A. Safety Walkouts As A Concerted Activity Under Section 7
Under section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 143 it is an unfair labor
practice for employers to curtail the exercise of employee rights
guaranteed by section 7 of the Act. The latter section provides that
"[e]mployees shall have the right to . . .engage in other concerted
activities for . . .mutual aid and protection.'
44
Concerted activities protected by section 7 include refusal to
work because of unsafe conditions of employment. In NLRB v.
141. Memorandum, supra note 133, at 26083. Unfair labor practice complaints
involving safety walkouts have been litigated since the date of the agreement.
See Sargent Electrical Co., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 182 (1978); Newport News Ship
Building & Dry Dock Co., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 197 (1978); Modern Carpet Industries,
Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. No. 132 (1978). It is certain, then, that the deferral is not
mandatory, at least where no prior filing under OSHA has occurred.
142. The Secretary of Labor has also adopted a deferral policy under OSHA. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1977.18(b) (1978) provides that the Secretary may postpone determination of a
complaint pending in arbitration or under the NLRB where (1) the rights
asserted in the other proceeding are substantially the same as OSHA's; (2) the
factual issues are substantially the same; and (3) the forum hearing the matter
has power to determine the ultimate issue of discrimination. The Secretary may
defer to the outcome of the other proceeding when the above conditions are met,
and the proceeding dealt adequately with all factual issues, was fair, regular,
and free of procedural error, and the outcome was not repugnant to the purpose
or policy of OSHA. Id. at § 1977.18(c). Whether the Secretary must defer to
arbitration rulings based on the same facts is a matter of controversy. Compare
Brennan v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 3 OSHRC 1654 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1975) with
Marshall v. General Motors Corp., No. C75-134Y (N.D. Ohio July 19, 1977) and
Brennan v. Pascoe Steel Corp., No. 74-73-COL (D. Md. Jan. 23, 1974). In
addition, the validity of agency deferral to private employment agreements has
been called into question by two Supreme Court rulings that the pendency or
outcome of grievance procedures has no effect on an individual's rights under
Title VII. See International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v.
Robbins & Meyers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974). But see N.L. Ind. v. Brennan, 3 OSHD (CCH) 23,105 (S.D.
Ind. June 30, 1978) (employee's acceptance of prior arbitration settlement bars
action under § 11(c) for discharge after refusing to accept dangerous work, absent
showing that acceptance was not voluntary - applying Gardner-Denver).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
144. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). For a general treatment of § 7, see Cox, The Right To
Engage In Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951).
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Washington Aluminum Co., 145 the Supreme Court held that a
walkout by seven employees occasioned by subfreezing temperatures
in their plant was a concerted activity, notwithstanding the
employer's work rule prohibiting such action. The policy of the
NLRA, the Court reasoned, was to protect the right of workers to act
together to better their working conditions. The walkout, it
concluded, was the most effective means available to wholly
unorganized employees to present their grievances and thus improve
their working conditions. 146
Several conditions must be met before section 7 can be invoked.
There first must be a labor dispute, defined by section 2(9) of the
NLRA in part as "any controversy concerning .. .conditions of
employment."'1 47 In addition, a specific remedy must be sought, and
the action must further some group interest, be taken in good
faith, 148 and not be unlawful or otherwise improper. 49 Because of the
latter requirement, union workers who refuse to work in violation of
a contractual obligation not to strike may not claim the benefits of
sections 7 and 8(a)(1).150 Moreover, section 7 offers no protection
when the worker's action is in derogation of the union's right of
exclusive representation.15' Section 7 is thus available both to
unorganized workers15 2 and union workers so long as the latter are
not acting in violation of their collective bargaining agreements153
145. 370 U.S. 9 (1961).
146. Id. at 14.
147. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964).
148. NLRB v. Red Top, Inc., 455 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1972).
149. Shelley & Anderson Furn. Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 1200,1202 (9th Cir. 1974).
150. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); United Electrical Radio & Machine
Workers, 223 F.2d 338 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 981 (1955); NLRB v.
Sunset Minerals, Inc., 211 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1954). An exception to this rule is
that employees may strike in violation of their contracts in order to protest a
serious unfair labor practice under the NLRA. Maestro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,
350 U.S. 270 (1956). By analogy to Maestro, it has been argued that employee
strikes to protest serious OSHA violations should be given protection under § 7,
even if in violation of no-strike agreements. Doppelt, OSHA: Impact On NLRA
And Arbitration, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1015, 1024-25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
DOPPELT].
151. Western Contracting Corp. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1963) (walkout by
truck drivers in attempt to have heaters installed in trucks protected by § 7
because the union supported the strike and thus walkout was not a "wildcat
strike"). But see South Central Timber Dev., Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 468, 95 L.R.R.M.
1442 (1978) (union longshoremen's refusal to load logs from snow laden rafts
when employer used inexperienced winchmen protected because workers were
not acting under union auspices).
152. See, e.g., NLRB v. KDI Precision Products, Inc., 436 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1971)
(circulating petition protesting excessive heat in workplace); Elam v. NLRB, 395
F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1968), enforcing 165 N.L.R.B. 22 (1967) (walkout in protest of
unsafe mail machine); NLRB v. Southern Silk Mills, Inc., 209 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 976 (1954) (walkout over excessive heat).
153. See, e.g., NLRB v. Belfry Coal Corp., 331 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1964), enforcing 139
N.L.R.B. 1058 (1962) (refusal to work in mine beyond posted danger signs); T & T
Industries, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1977) (refusal of worker to drive truck with
suspect brakes and headlights); G. W. Murphy Industries, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 996,
74 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1970) (walkout due to excessive smoke and heat).
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Although safety walkouts may be protected by section 7, the
NLRA does not provide a right to refuse unsafe work per se. The
right protected is one to engage in concerted activities. Conse-
quently, the extent of protection afforded by section 7 of the NLRA
to employees who walk off their jobs for safety reasons differs
significantly from that afforded by section 11(c) of OSHA, according
to the focus and purposes of each act.
First, the reasonableness of the employees' action under section
7 is irrelevant to the determination of whether a controversy exists
over conditions of employment.15 4 So long as employees have a good
faith belief in the existence of unsafe working conditions, their
actions constitute a labor dispute within NLRA section 2(9).
155
Under this subjective standard of review, neither the Board nor the
reviewing courts need scrutinize the actual conditions that provoked
the workers' action. The conditions can present no danger or
constitute only a minimal safety problem. 1 6 In contrast, under the
disputed OSHA regulation only a reasonable belief that there is a
real danger of death or serious harm will justify a walkout. A recent
finding by an OSHA compliance officer that a condition complied
with OSHA's safety standards would most certainly be the best
evidence to rebut employees' claims under section 11(c).
The second significant difference pertains to the persons
protected by each act. OSHA extends protection only to an
individual who is actually threatened with harm. 157 Depending on
the hazard, the right to refuse work could apply to one person or to
an entire factory, but a nexus between the condition and the
individual refusing work must be established. The NLRA, however,
requires that the employees' actions be "concerted" and undertaken
for "mutual aid and protection." This language has been interpreted
to encompass " 'intended, contemplated, or even referred to' group
action.' 1 58 No nexus between the condition promoting the walkout
and the actor need be established so long as the refusal to work is
over a shared grievance or in support of other workers' grievances.
For example, in Morrison-Knudsen v. NLRB, 5 9 the Court of Appeals
154. Washington Aluminum Co. v. NLRB, 370 U.S. 9,18 (1961); Union Boiler Co. v.
NLRB, 530 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), enforcing 213 N.L.R.B. 818
(1975); Essex International Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 260, 87 L.R.R.M. 1671 (1974).
155. Washington Aluminum Co. v. NLRB, 370 U.S. 9, 18 (1961).
156. See, e.g., NLRB v. Leslie Metal Arts Co., 509 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1975) (walkout
arising from failure of company to maintain plant discipline).
157. Compare 29 U.S.C. §660(c)(1) (1976) with 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b) (1978). The
statutory language would permit one to refuse work on behalf of others who are
exposed to danger while the regulation limits the right to those actually
threatened with danger.
158. Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1347 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 935 (1970) (quoting Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685
(3d Cir. 1964)).
159. 358 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1966).
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for the Ninth Circuit held that a father's refusal to work because of
the danger to which his son was exposed constituted a concerted
activity. The court reasoned that when employees "'make common
cause with a fellow workman over his separate grievance, and go out
on strike in his support, they engage in a 'concerted activity' for
'mutual aid or protection' although the aggrieved workman is the
only one of them who has any immediate stake in the outcome.' ,160
In addition, there is some doubt at the present time concerning
whether a solitary employee would be protected under the NLRA for
refusing to perform unsafe work. The NLRB seems to have adopted
the position that any safety related action will be deemed to be
concerted, notwithstanding lack of support from fellow workers. The
Board has ruled, for example, that when an employee makes a safety
complaint under OSHA or to a state health department, his action is
concerted because the benefit sought ultimately accrues to all
workers and thus concurrence of co-workers is implied.161 The
Third, 162 Fifth,163 and Ninth 164 Circuits, however, have refused to
accept the Board's implied concerted action theory. Under these
courts' decisions, a solitary employee who refuses hazardous work
that threatens only his well-being would not be protected by section
7.165
The procedural aspects of the two acts also differ. Under section
7, employees need not specifically notify an employer prior to
walking off the job of the nature of the grievance, 166 whereas under
OSHA a request must be made, conditions permitting, to the
employer to correct the safety hazard before a walkout can occur.
67
Finally, contrary to the assertion by the Sixth Circuit in
Whirlpool, the remedies afforded by each act are not coextensive.
160. Id. at 414 (quoting NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d
503, 505 (2d Cir. 1942)).
161. See Jim Causley Pontiac, 232 N.L.R.B. No. 37 (1977); B & P Motor Express, Inc.,
221 N.L.R.B. No. 96 (1977); Allelvia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 191 L.R.R.M.
1131 (1975) (cases holding that an employee who files a complaint with OSHA or
state health department protected by § 7 although acting alone, because benefit
sought accrues to all workers). See also NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388
F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1962) (attempts by solitary employee to enforce collective
bargaining contract deemed concerted, notwithstanding absence of co-worker
support).
162. NLRB v. Northern Metal Co., 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
163. NLRB v. Buddies Suprmkt., Inc., 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973).
164. NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning Co., 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973).
165. Id. (worker who voiced complaints about unsafe temporary stairs and refused to
go up stairs in the future not acting in concert for mutual aid and protection
when acting on his own behalf).
166. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962). The employee,
however, must give notice to the employer at some time during the labor dispute.
A.H.I. Mach. Tool & Die v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 190, 198 (6th Cir. 1970); NLRB v.
Marydale Prods. Co., 311 F.2d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 1963).
167. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(2)(b) (1978).
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Although an employer may not discharge or otherwise discriminate
against an employee for the exercise of protected section 7 activities,
he may permanently replace the striking worker. 168 Once a
permanent replacement is found, an employee has no right to be
reinstated. 169 Under OSHA, the employer is prohibited from
discriminating because of the exercise of protected rights. Because
the purpose of shielding the worker from employer retaliation is to
provide an alternative to employees facing a risk of serious injury,
discrimination within the meaning of OSHA would include abolition
of one's job or permanent replacement. Indeed, reinstatement is
expressly authorized as a remedy against unlawful employer
discrimination.' 70
B. Section 502 Of The LMRA
The right to refuse hazardous work is expressly protected by
section 502 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.1 71 It provides
that "the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of
employment . . . [shall not] be deemed a strike." This section has
particular importance for organized workers who have express or
implied no-strike obligations in their collective bargaining contracts.
A work stoppage under section 502 cannot be enjoined under section
301(a) of the LMRA.172 Moreover, section 502 protects from
168. A strike over conditions of employment is an economic strike, during which time
the employer may seek to continue operating by hiring permanent replacements.
See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). One striking over the
employer's unfair labor practices, however, may not be permanently replaced
and does have a right to be reinstated upon an unconditional request for
reinstatement. Maestro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). See
generally Comment, The Reinstatement Rights of Economic Strikers: Laidlaw
Five Years After, 3 U. BALT. L. REv. 89 (1973).
169. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
170. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1976).
171. 29 U.S.C. § 143 (1976).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976), provides that "[sluits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties .... This section conflicted with § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976), which limited the power of federal
courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes. In Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), the Supreme Court reconciled these two
provisions and held that federal courts can enjoin a strike in violation of an
express no-strike clause provided certain equitable considerations are met. An
injunction can also issue against a striking union that has agreed only to
compulsory arbitration, because an agreement not to strike may be implied from
an agreement to arbitrate. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974);
Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). See generally
Ashford & Katz, Unsafe Working Conditions: Employee Rights Under the Labor
Management Relations Act and The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 52
NOTRE DAME LAWYER, 802,809-14 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ASHFORD & KATZ];
ATLESON, supra note 10, at 665-75; Tobin, OSHA, Section 301 and the NLRB:
Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Rights, 23 AM. U.L. REv. 837, 841-45 (1974).
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retaliation employee action that would otherwise run afoul of the
contractual no-strike clause'7 3 and would be unprotected by section
8(a)(1) of the NLRA.
174
1. Abnormally Dangerous Conditions
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gateway Coal Co. v.
UMW,175 two tests had emerged to determine the existence of
abnormal dangerous conditions. The first test embraced by the
courts was a subjective one - a good faith belief that conditions at
the workplace were abnormally dangerous brought an employee's
action under the protective umbrella of section 502.176 Furthermore,
the testimony of employees was held admissible to prove the
existence of physical conditions provoking the walkout.7 7 The
subject good faith test was later rejected by the NLRB in Redwing
Carriers178 in which the Board adopted an objective evidence test:
It is necessary first to clarify the meaning of the term
"abnormally dangerous conditions" as used in Section 502.
We are of the opinion that the term contemplates, and is
intended to insure, an objective as opposed to a subjective
test. What controls is not the state of mind of the employee
or employees concerned, but whether the actual working
conditions shown to exist by competent evidence might in
the circumstances reasonably be considered "abnormally
dangerous."' 17
9
The objective evidence test enunciated in Redwing received
approval by the Supreme Court in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, s°
which involved a local union of the U.M.W. that walked off the job
because management rehired two supervisors who had falsified
tunnel air flow recordings. The union refused to arbitrate the dispute
under its compulsory arbitration agreement, and the employer
subsequently sought to obtain an injunction against the work
stoppage and to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,"" which had held
173. See, e.g., Interlake, Inc. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1976); Combustion
Eng'r, Inc., Power Sys. Div., 224 N.L.R.B. 542, 93 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1976). ASHFORD
& KATZ, supra note 172, at 807; ATLESON supra note 10, at 659.
174. See text accompanying note 150 supra.
175. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
176. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 466 F.2d 1157, 1160 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 368
(1974); NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 757 (6th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 927 (1958).
177. NLRB v. Knight Morley Corp., 251 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 927 (1958).
178. 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961), enforced as modified sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v.
NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
179. Id. at 1209.
180. 414 U.S. 368, 385-87 (1974).
181. 466 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1972).
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that safety disputes were not arbitrable, and ordered the union to
submit its grievance to binding arbitration. The Court in Gateway
held that safety issues were presumed to be included in a union's
duty to arbitrate, absent express exclusion from collective bargain-
ing contracts. In so holding, the Court extended the policy favoring
arbitration and peaceful settlement of labor disputes established in
the Steelworkers trilogy8 2 to encompass safety issues.
Concomitantly, the Gateway Court reaffirmed the right of
workers to refuse to work under abnormally dangerous conditions.
The Court stated "that a work stoppage called solely to protect
employees from immediate danger is authorized by § 502 and cannot
be the basis for either a damages award or a Boys Market
injunction." 18 3 The Gateway Court, however, rejected the Third
Circuit's view that a good faith belief in the existence of abnormal
conditions invokes the protection of section 502, reasoning that
"[a]bsent the most explicit statutory command, we are unwilling to
conclude that Congress intended the public policy favoring arbitra-
tion and peaceful resolution of labor disputes to be circumvented by
so slender a thread as subjective judgment, however honest it may
be." 184 An employee seeking to justify a contractually prohibited
work stoppage under section 502 must present "ascertainable,
objective evidence supporting [his] conclusion that an abnormally
dangerous condition for employment exists."185 Accordingly, the
Court held in Gateway that objective evidence was lacking to justify
a continued refusal to work and issued an injunction against the
walkout.
The objective evidence test has created an additional barrier to
employees seeking to vindicate the right to avoid hazardous work.
Not only must an employee prove that a danger in fact existed and
that he acted in good faith, but he must also establish that the
danger was greater than that considered normal for the type of work
concerned. In Anaconda Aluminum,186 the NLRB defined the
evidentiary burden upon employees claiming section 502 protection
as follows:
Absent the emergence of new factors or circumstances which
change the character of the danger, work which is recog-
nized and accepted by employees as inherently dangerous
182. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). In khe Steelworkers
trilogy, the Supreme Court established the principle that the subject of a labor
dispute is presumed to be arbitrable unless expressly excluded from an
arbitration clause.
183. 414 U.S. at 385.
184. Id. at 386.
185. Id. at 386-87.
186. 197 N.L.R.B. 336, 80 L.R.R.M. 1780 (1972).
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does not become "abnormally dangerous" merely because
employee patience with prevailing conditions wears thin or
their forbearance ceases.
187
Requiring that the danger be abnormal before a worker is
permitted to refuse work is particularly harsh when applied to
hazardous occupations. A condition may be imminently threatening
to life or limb, but if part of the custom in the trade'88 or if tolerated
in the past by employees, 8 9 it does not justify a refusal to work nor
does it prevent employer retaliation. The abnormally dangerous
requirement also demonstrates the limited utility of section 502 in
preventing work-related injury. It effectively gives license to
employers to continue unsafe operating procedures.
Recent decisions and the advent of OSHA indicate that the
definition of abnormally dangerous conditions may be undergoing
revision. In Banyard v. NLRB, 190 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed an NLRB decision' 9' that an
arbitrator's ruling was determinative concerning a subsequently
filed unfair labor practice complaint under sections 7 and 502. The
arbitrator had ruled that a truck driver could be ordered under the
terms of his union contract to continue an unsafe and illegal work
practice. The court of appeals held that the NLRB could not defer
resolution of an unfair labor practice complaint to an arbitrator's
ruling requiring employees to violate state statutory safety require-
ments, because such a ruling was repugnant to the purpose of the
NLRA. 192 Although not directly addressing the scope of the right to
187. Id. at 344 (emphasis added). Accord, Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 473,
481, 54 L.R.R.M. 1414, 1415 (1963) (routine breakdown of blower system in a
lumber yard causing "discomfort" in breathing, coughing, sneezing, and spitting
of dust not an abnormal danger). Evidence of new factors that changed the
character of a danger was found in Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland
Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975) (threat of violence
entailed in crossing another union's lawful picket line); Philadelphia Marine
Trade Ass'n v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 492 (3d Cir. 1964), enforcing 138 N.L.R.B. 737
(1962), cert. denied sub nom. Longshoremen Local v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 841 (1964)
(use of pallets rather than slings in unloading cargo); Combustion Eng'r, Inc.,
224 N.L.R.B. 542, 93 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1976) (threat of violence from two intruders
on worksite).
188. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruin-Colnon Constr. Co., 330 F.2d 885, 890-91 (8th Cir. 1964)
(mining workers widening shaft not justified in refusing work where work
platform, although dangerously slippery, had been built at a slant); Anaconda
Aluminum, 197 N.L.R.B. 336, 344, 80 L.R.R.M. 1780, 1782 (1972) (employees
following normal work procedures exposed to pot full of hot pitch (tar) not
justified in refusing to work).
189. See, e.g., G.F. & I. Steel Corp. v. U.M.W., No. C-5083 (D. Colo. Nov. 12, 1973) (lack
of medical services available at mine not basis for walkout when union had
several months earlier complained about medical services without finding any
need to stop work).
190. 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
191. McLean Trucking Co., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 82 L.R.R.M. 1652 (1973).
192. 505 F.2d at 347.
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refuse hazardous work under section 502 of the LMRA, the decision
suggests that abnormally dangerous conditions should be defined by
statutory safety standards such as those in OSHA. Indeed, several
commentators have argued that OSHA standards should be
employed as definitions of conditions that are abnormally hazardous
or used as conclusive presumptions of such dangers. 193 The Supreme
Court in Gateway, however, strongly implied that any statutory
right in derogation of a contractual obligation not to strike should be
narrowly interpreted. The OSHA standards used to define abnor-
mally dangerous conditions would consequently be limited to
imminent dangers or serious safety violations. 194
2. Section 502 and Section 11(c)
A worker who has been discriminated against because of a work
stoppage justified by section 502 of the LMRA may file an unfair
labor practice complaint with the NLRB. When the NLRB defers
such complaints to OSHA, workers will find the extent of protection
from employer retaliation changed in several respects. Whether
section 502 provides a right of group action or extends only to
employees threatened by a danger has never been decided. 195 Under
section 11(c) of OSHA, the right is an individual one.1 96 In addition,
the reasonable belief standard of section 11(c) is considerably more
flexible than the objective evidence test of section 502; an employee
cannot be penalized for an incorrect assessment of a condition
provided it is reasonable under the circumstances, whereas section
502 protects only those whose perceptions of a danger are consistent
with an objective determination of the degree of actual danger
involved. Furthermore, the degree of danger enabling workers to
refuse work under each statute also varies. Only a serious threat to
life or limb will sustain an action under OSHA, while the nature of
the occupation determines the extent of danger that would allow
workers to refuse work under section 502. Section 11(c) could thus be
used to expand the situations in which employees in particularly
hazardous occupations can refuse to work while narrowing the scope
of the right to refuse work in occupations where threats to life and
limb are uncommon.
193. ASHFORD & KATZ, supra note 172, at 826-34. ATLESON, supra note 10, at 706. It
has also been suggested that the objective evidence test of § 502 be replaced by a
standard of reasonableness similar to that of the regulation interpreting section
11(c) of OSHA. Id. at 711-13.
194. OSHA § 17(j), 29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1976) defines a serious violation as one where
"there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could
result." See OSHA FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL, Ch. VIII(B), supra note 51, at
9$4360.2.
195. But see Clark Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 510
F.2d 1075, 1079 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Union Carbide Corp., 265 F.
Supp. 756, 760 (D.D.C. 1966) (cases state that § 502 is available only to workers
exposed to danger).
196. But see note 157 supra.
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A unique aspect of section 502 is that it also prevents a walkout
from being considered a strike. When a walkout is provoked by an
abnormal danger, therefore, an employer cannot obtain an injunc-
tion against the action pursuant to section 301(a) of the NLRA.197
Unlike section 502, the regulation issued under section 11(c) of
OSHA, does not specifically state that employee action qualifying
under its aegis is not a strike. It merely provides a right of action to
the employee if the employer discriminates because of the exercise of
protected rights. Because a walkout by union employees under a no-
strike obligation could conceivably meet the requirement of section
11(c), but not those of section 502, a problem arises as to whether
action taken under section 11(c) may be enjoined under section
301(a) of the NLRA. It could be argued that an injunction would
constitute employer interference with protected rights under OSHA
and therefore could not be obtained. Moreover, it is doubtful whether
equity could grant an injunction consistent with the "clean hands"
rule to an employer whose own action in violating a statutory duty
under OSHA promoted the employee walkout. 198 In addition, if
section 11(c) does not prohibit an injunction, an anomalous situation
could occur: the employer could secure an injunction against a
walkout, yet be liable under section 11(c) for any subsequent
disciplinary action imposed because of the employee's refusal to
work. The employer's duty not to discriminate would not be
coterminous with the employee's no-strike duty.
Implying a parallel right to refuse unsafe work under OSHA
creates ambiguities in the extent of a union's no-strike obligations.
The problems can be avoided, however, through contract negotia-
tion. A no-strike obligation can be expressly negated or safety issues
exempted from the duty not to strike.199 In this event, union workers
would not violate their contracts when they walk off the job for
safety reasons, and sections 502 and 301(a) would accordingly be
inapplicable. Also, provisions defining the conditions under which
workers would be entitled to refuse to work could be incorporated
into collective bargaining agreements. 200
197. See text accompanying note 172 supra.
198. DOPPELT, supra note 150, at 1024.
199. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974). This may be an unrealistic
alternative because 90% of all collective bargaining agreements have uncondi-
tional or conditional no-strike pledges. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, Basic
Patterns In Union Contracts, §95:4 (7th ed. 1971)..
200. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. UMW, 519 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1975); Hanna
Mine Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 464 F.2d 565 (8th Cir. 1972).
Hazardous work clauses are found in approximately 10% of union contracts.
Seven out of ten clauses enable a worker to refuse hazardous work on the spot.
The remaining 30% require the worker to follow a prescribed procedure such as
notifying management before refusing work. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
supra note 199, at § 95:4. Safety committees are a prominent feature of safety-
related contract provisions. Nineteen percent of non-manufacturing industry
contracts provide for such committees, while 38% of manufacturing industry
contracts do so. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Assessing the validity of the OSHA regulation creating the right
of workers to refuse hazardous jobs involves an examination
of congressional intent, the language and purpose of OSHA,
comparable provisions in other labor statutes, and national labor
law policy. Arguments exist supporting both the Department of
Labor's and industry's interpretations of OSHA.
On the side of industry, it can be argued that workers already
have the prerogative to refuse unsafe work under the NLRA and
LMRA. Creating a parallel right under OSHA produces duplication
of rights and unnecessary conflict in the jurisdiction of the two acts.
Consequently, employers will not know when they are within their
rights to discipline or fire workers who walk out because of unsafe
employment conditions.
The agreement between the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration and the NLRB attempts to minimize the duplication.
It does not, however, eliminate the problems with respect to the
rights to refuse hazardous work and engage in concerted action. The
scope of the protection given to employees who walk off the job
because of unsafe conditions varies under each act. Because the
NLRB will not defer to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration when an employee does not file under OSHA,
workers can still choose to file a discrimination complaint under the
statute affording the greatest protection to their conduct. It may also
be possible for a person to relitigate a discrimination complaint
under one act after obtaining an unsatisfactory result under the
other.20 1 Moreover, the NLRB's deferral policy itself may alter the
scope of rights under the NLRA in a manner not intended by
Congress. Finally, because OSHA is applicable to union workers, the
regulation allowing employees to refuse work will have undeter-
mined consequences for the scope of contractual agreements not to
strike.
Notwithstanding these problems, several considerations recom-
mend validation of the right created by the Department of Labor
regulation. The scope of the right in the regulation is coextensive
with the need for self-help under OSHA. Unlike the self-help
remedies of the NLRA, the regulation does not conflict with the
administrative mechanisms available to eliminate occupational
injury. In addition, the regulation is specifically designed to protect
workers from injury while the NLRA and LMRA rights regulate
201. See Brennan v. Alan Wood Steel Co., No. 74-1810 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1975). OSHA
will only defer to the outcome of other proceedings if the rights and facts
involved are "substantially" the same. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.18(b) (1978). Since §§ 7
and 502 differ from § 1(c) in material respects, it could be asserted that the
NLRA rights are not substantially the same and thus OSHA need not defer to
the results of unfair labor practice complaint litigation.
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relations between labor and management. Most importantly, the
policy favoring peaceful settlement of labor controversies is not
contravened by the regulation. An employee is permitted to resort to
self-help only when statutory means are unavailable to prevent
serious injury or death and only if there is an objective basis to
conclude that an imminent danger is present.
With the current split between the Fifth and Sixth Circuits over
the Secretary's regulation, as well as the importance of the issue
presented, it is simply a matter of time before the Supreme Court
decides to resolve the conflict between the circuits. Congress could, of
course, easily resolve the issue by amending OSHA to permit or
disallow the result reached by Whirlpool. Express congressional
affirmance or denial of the right to walk off a hazardous jobsite is
needed to end the controversy over section 11(c) of OSHA.
Susan Preston
